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The 12 October bombing in Bali that killed more than
180 people seemed to vindicate the claims of those
who had been accusing the Indonesian authorities of
deliberately ignoring the presence on Indonesian
soil of Islamic terrorists connected with al-Q aci d a
network. More sober voices commented that domes-
tic power struggles, rather than international terror-
ism, might be responsible for this outrage. It was the
largest, but by no means the first major bomb explo-
sion in Indonesia.
Indonesia has seen many bomb explosions
since the fall of Suharto in May 1998, and in
many cases military personnel appear to be
involved. There are also, however, a number
of small but conspicuously violent radical Is-
lamic movements that engage in jihad in
such places as the Moluccas and Central Su-
lawesi or act as vigilante squads raiding
nightclubs, discotheques, and other dens of
i n e q u i t y .1 Surprisingly perhaps, several of
these militias maintain close relations with
factions in the military or political élite.
Laskar Jihad
The largest and best organized of the vari-
ous Muslim militias – until it was suddenly
disbanded in early October, only days before
the Bali bombing – was the Laskar Jihad,
which was established in response to the
onset of civil war between Christians and
Muslims in the Moluccas, in 2000.2 I d e o l o g i-
cally this movement is very close to the Saudi
religious establishment. Its leader, J acf a r
Umar Thalib, had studied with strict Salafi
ulama in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and taken
part in jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
After his return to Indonesia, he became one
of the leading lights of the Indonesian Salafi
movement, which promoted, Wahhabi style,
an apolitical Islam based on a strictly literal
reading of the Qur'an and h a d i t h. Most mem-
bers appeared to be students or university
graduates and dropouts. Religious leader-
ship is provided by young men, mostly of
Arab descent like J acf a r himself, who have
also studied with Arabian Salafi ulama. 
Laskar Jihad had the visible support of ele-
ments in the police and armed forces. It
moved thousands of fighters to Ambon and
later to other conflict areas in Central Sulawe-
si, West Papua, and Acheh. In all these areas,
a close cooperation with the Indonesian mili-
tary, notably the Special Forces (Kopassus)
developed. 
Following 11 September, Laskar Jihad im-
mediately took pains to distance itself from
Usama bin Laden. J acf a r Umar Thalib de-
clared that he had met Usama back in the
1980s when he fought in Afghanistan but did
not consider him as a good Muslim. The
Laskar Jihad website reproduced a fatwa by
the late grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdu-
laziz bin Baz, in which Usama bin Laden was
declared an erring sectarian and rebel, whose
example no pious Muslim should follow.
In April 2002, the Laskar Jihad challenged
a peace agreement between Ambonese
Christians and Muslims that had been bro-
kered by cabinet ministers. A Christian vil-
lage was raided and part of its population
massacred. Eyewitnesses claim that Laskar
Jihad fighters carried out this raid jointly
with a Kopassus unit. This time, J acf a r w a s
detained and put on trial. While his trial was
continuing, J acf a r announced in early Octo-
ber 2002 the disbanding of the Laskar Jihad
and ordered his followers to return to their
homes. These instructions were in most
places obeyed with a surprising meekness. 
J e m a a h Islamiyah 
The organization most often mentioned
as a likely perpetrator of the Bali bomb mas-
sacre is the Jemaah Islamiyah, which has
been described by some experts as the
Southeast Asian branch of al-Q aci d a. Four al-
leged members of this network are often
mentioned as its chief terrorists: Hambali,
alias Ridwan Isamuddin, a West Javanese ac-
cused of masterminding the bombing of
churches in 10 Indonesian cities at Christ-
mas in 2000, and of taking part in a series of
bombings in Manila in 2000 (still at large);
Abdur Rahman al-Ghozi, an East Javanese,
arrested in the Philippines in January 2002,
who reportedly confessed to having taken
part in the same bombings in Manila in 2000
and in preparations for attacks on US assets
in Singapore; Muhammad Iqbal bin Abdur-
rahman, alias Abu Jibril, of Lombok, author
of a book on the obligation for every Muslim
to carry out jihad, and a recruiter for jihad in
the Moluccas, has been detained in Malaysia
since January 2002 and accused of acting as
a financial conduit for al-Q aci d a; and Agus
Dwikarna, who was arrested at Manila Air-
port in March 2002 when the authorities al-
legedly found a large amount of explosives
in his luggage. Dwikarna is the commander
of a Muslim militia, Jundullah, in his native
province of South Sulawesi. 
Abu Bakar B aca s y i r is alleged to be the
spiritual leader of this network, although he
cannot be directly linked to any of the inci-
dents. All four men named above have an
undeniable direct connection with him,
however: al-Ghozi studied at his school, Abu
Jibril paid a recent visit to the school and
took part in the founding conference of a
militant organization that chose B acasyir a s
its leader, and Dwikarna is a committee
member of that same organization. Hambali
is reported to have lived near B aca s y i r d u r-
ing part of the period the latter spent in
M a l a y s i a .
It is not entirely clear to what extent this
Jemaah Islamiyah actually is a real organiza-
tion with a well-defined membership and
structure of authority. Abu Bakar B aca s y i r
has not been afraid of openly proclaiming
his admiration for Usama bin Laden, but he
denies any direct contact with him. B aca s y i r
is the a m i r or commander of a public associ-
ation of radical Muslims, the Council of
Jihad Fighters (Majelis Mujahidin), that was
established in August 2002. This organiza-
tion has a paramilitary wing, the Laskar Mu-
jahidin, which has trained followers in guer-
rilla techniques and sent them to fight a
jihad in the Moluccas. At least dozens, possi-
bly a few hundred, of its members gained
combat experience in Afghanistan in the
1980s; many more are likely to have fought
in the southern Philippines. 
The term J e m a a hI s l a m i y a h has been used
repeatedly during the past twenty years by
police authorities as the name for a loose
network of radicals in which B aca s y i r, be-
sides another preacher of Arab descent, Ab-
dullah Sungkar, played a central role. They
jointly led an Islamic boarding school near
the town of Solo since the early 1970s, and
they joined the underground Darul Islam
movement opposing the Suharto regime
and striving for an Islamic state. 
They contributed to this movement ideas
that they borrowed from the Egyptian Mus-
lim Brothers (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun). The
struggle for an Islamic state, according to
these ideas, was a step-by-step process in
which the activist had first to engage in
moral self-improvement, then to be part of
a 'family' (u s r a h) of like-minded people who
guide, help, and control one another. These
are steps towards the building of an Islamic
community (j a m aca h i s l a m i y a h), which in
turn is a precondition for the establishment
of an Islamic state. From their Islamic school
near Solo, B aca s y i r and Sungkar set up a net-
work of committed young Muslims, some of
them quietist, some of them militants, all of
them opposed to the Suharto regime, orga-
nized in 'families' that together were to con-
stitute a true community of committed
Muslims, a j a m aca hi s l a m i y a h. 
Facing arrest in the mid-1980s, B aca s y i r
and Sungkar escaped to Malaysia. Accord-
ing to sources close to the Usrah movement,
a Saudi recruiting officer visited Indonesia
in 1984 or 1985 and identified Sungkar's
and another Darul Islam-related group as
the only firm and disciplined Islamic com-
munities (j a m aca h) capable of jihad. Both
were offered financial support to send 50
fighters to Afghanistan. Sungkar found only
four men willing to go, the other group
eight men. The following year, slightly larg-
er groups of volunteers were sent, and so it
went on until 1989, when the Russians with-
drew from Afghanistan. Henceforth, they
sent their militants to the southern Philip-
p i n e s .
For fourteen years, Sungkar and B aca s y i r
remained in Malaysia, living in a village with
a circle of their closest disciples and travel-
ling around delivering religious sermons.
They were visited by radicals from Indonesia
and other regions of Southeast Asia. After
Suharto's fall, they returned to Indonesia.
Sungkar died in Jakarta during his first re-
turn visit; B aca s y i r settled again in his p e-
s a n t r e n at Ngruki near Solo. The establish-
ment of the Majelis Mujahidin in August
2000 gave him a very public profile. 
Other groups
There are a number of other, loosely con-
nected and to some extent competing un-
derground networks that continue the
struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia.
They go by the old name of Darul Islam or al-
ternatively NII/TII, abbreviations for Islamic
State of Indonesia/Islamic Army of Indone-
sia. They are not known to have been in-
volved in major violent incidents recently.
The Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Front of De-
fenders of Islam), with its members dressed
in white flowing robes and white turbans,
has been conspicuous in numerous demon-
strations in Jakarta. They carried out numer-
ous raids on bars, brothels, and nightclubs
in Jakarta and the nearby hill districts, caus-
ing great material damage but few casual-
ties. Their leader, Habib (Sayyid) Rizieq Shi-
hab, also studied in Saudi Arabia and is a
firm proponent of the application of the
s h a r ica in public life. He appears to have ex-
cellent relations with members of the mili-
tary and political élite. The Front is definite-
ly the least ideologically motivated of the
militant groups listed here, and it is believed
that its successes in bringing demonstrators
to the streets are primarily due to financial
incentives. Not long after 12 October, Rizieq
Shihab was arrested (for reasons apparently
unrelated to the Bali bombing) and the
Front was ordered to disband, which the
members did without any sign of protest.
The ease with which FPI and Laskar Jihad
could be disbanded once the military au-
thorities really demanded so not only indi-
cates the degree to which both have come
under military influence but also reflects the
fact that they accept the (secular) govern-
ment of Indonesia as legitimate in principle
– unlike the Majelis Mujahidin, which wishes
to transform it into an Islamic state and has
not been known to court military or civilian
élite factions. 
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